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THE RIGHT TO DEFENSE EXPERTS 
Paul C. Giannelli 
Professor of Law 
Case Western Reserve University 
In many criminal cases, securing the services of 
experts to examine evidence, to advise counsel, 
and to testify at trial is critical. As the ABA Stand-
ards note, "The quality of representation at trial 
may be excellent and yet valueless to the defend-
ant if his defense requires ... the services of a 
handwriting expert and no such service[] is avail-
able." Standards Relating to Providing Defense 
Services 5-1.4 (2d ed. 1980). 
Obtaining the services of experts is not difficult 
for the prosecution. Typically, the prosecution has 
access to the services of state, county, or metro-
politan crime laboratories. E.g., Kan. Stat. Ann. § 
21-2502 (1981); La. Rev. Stat. Ann.§ 33-1559.1 (West 
Supp. 1982); Ohio Rev. Code Ann. § 307.75 
(Baldwin 1978). In addition, federal forensic 
laboratories often provide their services to state 
law enforcement agencies. For example, the ser-
vices of the FBI Laboratory are "available without 
charge to all duly constituted state, county, and 
municipal law enforcement agencies of the United 
States and its territorial possessions." Williams, 
The FBI Laboratory-Its Availability and Use by 
Prosecutors from Investigation to Trial, 28 U. Kan. 
City L. Rev. 95, 99 (1960). See also Federal Bureau 
of Investigation, Handbook of Forensic Science 6 
(Rev. ed. 1979). These services include both the ex-
amination of evidence and the court appearance of 
the expert. 
Such services are generally not available to 
criminal defendants. This may account for the dis-
parity between the defense and prosecution use of 
experts. The voiceprint cases illustrate this prob-
lem. As one study noted: "A striking fact about the 
trials involving voicegram evidence to date is the 
very large proportion in which the only experts tes-
tifying were those called by the state." National 
Academy of Sciences, On the Theory and Practice 
of Voice Identification 49 (1979). See also People v. 
Chapter, 13 Grim. L. Rep. 2479 (Cal. Super. Ct. 
1973) ("In approximately eighty percent of the 
twenty-five [voiceprint] cases in which such expert 
testimony/opinion was admitted there was no 
opposing expert testimony on the issue of reliabil-
ity and general acceptability of the scientific com-
munity .... "). 
A number of statutory provisions, state and fed-
eral, attempt to provide expert assistance to indi-
gent criminal defendants. In addition, some courts 
have recognized a constitutional right to expert 
assistance. Finally, trial courts have the authority 
to appoint experts to assist them. 
STATUTORY PROVISIONS 
Federal 
In federal trials, the Criminal Justice Act pro-
vides for expert assistance for indigent defend-
ants. Section (e)(1) of the Act reads: 
Counsel for a person who is financially unable to ob-
tain investigative, expert, or other services necessary 
for an adequate defense may request them in an ex 
parte application. Upon finding, after appropriate in-
quiry in an ex parte proceeding, that the services are 
necessary and the person is financially unable to ob-
tain them, the court, or the United States magistrate if 
the services are required in connection with a matter 
over which he has jurisdiction, shall authorize counsel 
to obtain the services. 18 U.S.C. § 3006(A)(e)(1) (1976). 
See generally Oaks, Obtaining Compensation and 
Defense Services Under the Federal Criminal Jus-
tice Act, in 1 Criminal Defense Techniques ch. 7 
(1069); 3 C. Wright, Federal Practice and Procedure 
§ 740 (1969); Annat., 6 A.L.R. Fed. 1007 (1971). The 
Act limits expenses for expert services to $300.00 
unless the court certifies that a greater amount is 
"necessary to provide fair compensation for ser-
vices of an unusual character or duration." 18 
U.S.C. § 3006(A)(e)(3) (1976). 
The general purpose of the Criminal Justice Act 
is to "achieve more meaningful and effective 
representation for defendants in Federal criminal 
cases." H.R. Rep. No. 1546, 91st Gong., 2d Sess. 4, 
reprinted in 1970 U.S. Code Gong. & Ad. News 
3982, 3984. In interpreting section (e), the courts 
have identified a number of purposes: (1) "to 
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redress the imbalance in the criminal process 
when the resources of the United States Govern-
ment are pitted against an indigent defendant," 
U.S. v. Durant, 545 F.2d 823, 827 (2d Cir. 1976); (2) 
"to place indigent defendants as nearly as may be 
on a level of equality with nonindigent defendants 
in the defense of criminal cases," U.S. v. Tate, 419 
F.2d 131, 132 (6th Cir. 1969); and (3) "to accord fed-
eral prisoners fu!l constitutional rights under the 
Due Process and the Sixth Amendment." Mason v. 
Arizona, 504 F.2d 1345, 1352 (9th Cir. 1974), cert. 
denied, 420 U:S. 936 (1975). 
A defendant seeking funds under the Act must 
meet a two-pronged test: "(1) The accused must 
satisfy the court that financial inability prevents 
him from obtaining the services he requests; and 
(2) The accused must show need for such services 
to present an adequate defense." U.S. v. Schultz, 
431 F.2d 907, 908 (8th Cir. 1970). The most common 
type of expert requested pursuant to the statute is 
the psychiatrist in insanity defense cases. E.g., 
U.S. v. Reason, 549 F.2d 309 (4th Cir. 1977); U.S. v. 
Bass, 477 F.2d 723 (9th Cir. 1973). See generally 
Comment, Developing Standards for Psychiatric 
Assistance for Indigents Under the Criminal Jus-
tice Act, 59 Iowa L. Rev. 726 (1974); Note, Criminal 
Procedure: The Indigent's Right to Psychiatric 
Assistance at Trial, 20 Wayne L. Rev. 1365 (1974); 
Note, The Criminal Justice Act of 1964-The 
Defendant's Right to an Independent Psychiatric 
Examination, 28 Wash. & Lee L. Rev. 443 (1971); 
Annat., 40 A.L.R. Fed. 707 (1978). Other requests 
have involved polygraph examiners, U.S. v. Penick, 
496 F.2d 1105 (7th Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 
897 (1974); psychologists, U.S. v. Sims, 617 F.2d 
1371 (9th Cir. 1980); fingerprint experts, U.S. v. 
Durant, 545 F.2d 823 (2d Cir. 1976); and handwriting 
examiners, U.S. v. Sailer, 552 F.2d 213 (8th Cir.), 
cert. denied, 431 U.S. 959 (1977). See also U.S. v. 
Moss, 544 F.2d 954 (8th Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 429 
U.S. 1077 (1977) (optometrist); U.S. v. Harris, 542 
F.2d 1283 (7th Cir. 1976) (clinical psychologist to 
assist in jury selection and request for urban 
sociologist). 
Both the application for defense services and 
the proceedings to determine whether to grant the 
request are ex parte. As one court has noted, "The 
manifest purpose of requiring that the inquiry be 
ex parte is to insure that the defendant will not 
have to make a premature disclosure of his case." 
Marshall v. U.S., 423 F.2d 1315, 1318 (10th Cir. 
1970). In effect, the provision permits the expert to 
"be a partisan witness. His conclusions need not 
be reported in advance of trial to the court or to 
the prosecution." U.S. v. Bass, 477 F.2d 723, 726 
(9th Cir. 1973). 
The Act entitles indigent defendants to expert 
"services necessary for an adequate defense." 18 
U.S.C. § 3006(A)(e) (1976). This standard has been 
interpreted by a number of courts. The Ninth Cir-
cuit has held that "[t]he statute requires the dis-
trict judge to authorize defense services when the 
defense attorney makes a timely request in circum-
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stances in which a reasonable attorney would 
engage such services for a client having independ-
ent financial means to pay for them." U.S. v. Bass, 
477 F.2d 723, 725 (9th Cir. 1973). This includes 
"pretrial and trial assistance to the defense as 
well as potential trial testimony." /d. at 726. Other 
courts have adopted this interpretation and added 
further elaboration. See U.S. v. Armstrong, 621 F.2d 
951 (9th Cir. 1980); U.S. v. Sims, 617 F.2d 1371 (9th 
Cir. 1980); U.S. v. Durant, 545 F.2d 823, 827 (2d Cir. 
1976); Brinkley v. U.S., 498 F.2d 505, 509-10 (8th Cir. 
1974). For example, the Second Circuit has stated 
that "'[n]ecessary' should at least mean 'reason-
ably necessary,' and 'an adequate defense' must 
include preparation for cross-examination of a gov-
ernment expert as well as presentation of an ex-
pert defense witness." U.S. v. Durant, 545 F.2d 823, 
827 (2d Cir. 1976). Thus, the admissibility of an ex-
pert's testimony is not the only relevant factor in 
considering a request for a defense expert under 
the statute. U.S. v. Sims, 617 F.2d 1371, 1375 n.3 
(9th Cir. 1980). 
State 
A number of state statutes and rules also pro-
vide for expert assistance for indigent defendants. 
These provisions, however, differ in many respects. 
Some explicitly provide for the services of experts, 
Minn. Stat. Ann.§ 611.21 (West Supp. 1982), while 
others mention only investigative services. Alaska 
Stat.§ 18.85.100 (1981). Still others refer merely to 
the reimbursement of reasonable or necessary ex-
penses incurred by attorneys representing indigent 
defendants. Colo. Rev. Stat. § 21-1-105 (1973). 
The coverage of these provisions also differs 
with respect to the type of crime charged. Some 
are limited to felony or capital cases, e.g., Fla. 
Stat. Ann.§ 914.06 (West 1973) (felony cases); Ga. 
Code Ann. § 27-3001(a) (1978) (capital cases). An 
Ohio statute is limited to controlled substance 
prosecutions. Ohio Rev. Code Ann. § 2925.51 (Bald-
win 1979). Moreover, some statutes provide for the 
payment of reasonable expenses, Fla. Stat. Ann. § 
914.06 (West 1973), while others specify a maxi-
mum amount, Ga. Code Ann.§ 27-3001(a) (1978) 
($500). A number of the latter statutes provide for 
expenses above the maximum in some circum-
stances. N.H. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 604-A:6 (1974) ($300 
except in extraordinary circumstances). The 
procedures specified for obtaining expert 
assistance also vary. A number of statutes follow 
the Criminal Justice Act and provide for ex parte 
proceedings. E.g., Kan. Stat. Ann.§ 22-4508 (1981); 
Minn. Stat. Ann.§ 611.21 (West Supp. 1982). Other 
statutes contain no such provision. 
CONSTITUTIONAL REQUIREMENTS 
The right of an indigent defendant to the ser-
vices of expert witnesses may be based on several 
different constitutional grounds: effective assist-
ance of counsel, equal protection, due process, or 
compulsory process. The courts, however; are 
divided over this issue. Annat., 34 A.L.R. 3d 1256 
(1970). See generally Margolin & Wagner, The lndi-
gent Criminal Defendant and Defense Services: A 
Search for Constitutional Standards, 24 Hastings 
L.J. 647 (1973); Note, The Indigent's Right to an 
Adequate Defense: Expert and Investigational As-
sistance in Criminal Proceedings, 55 Cornell L. 
Rev. 632 (1970); Note, Right to Aid in Addition to 
Counsel tor Indigent Criminal Defendants, 47 Minn. 
L. Rev. 1054 (1963). 
The U.S. Supreme Court has considered the 
issue only once. In U.S. ex rei. Smith v. Baldi, 344 
U.S. 561 (1953), a murder defendant argued that 
"the assistance of a psychiatrist was necessary to 
afford him adequate counsel" in the presentation 
of his insanity defense, and thus the state was 
obligated to provide such assistance. In rejecting 
this argument, the Court stated, "We cannot say 
that the State has that duty by constitutional man-
date." /d. at 568. The precedential value of Baldi, 
however, seems questionable. First, the case was 
decided in 1953, well before the right to counsel 
and the compulsory process clauses were applied 
directly to the states and before more recent cases 
delineating the scope of equal protection and due 
process rights were decided. Second, two defense 
psychiatrists did testify at the defendant's trial. Im-
mediately after writing that the duty to provide ex-
pert assistance was not compelled by "constitu-
tional mandate," the Court wrote: "As we have 
shown, the issue of petitioner's sanity was heard 
by the trial court. Psychiatrists testified. That suf-
fices." /d. This may indicate only that the defend-
ant did not have a right to an additional expert 
witness. 
Effective Assistance of Counsel 
In Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963), the 
U.S. Supreme Court held the Sixth Amendment 
right to counsel applicable to the states. Accord-
ingly, the state must provide counsel to indigent 
defendants. As the Court noted in Gideon, "[l]n our 
, __ adversary system of criminal justice, any person 
hailed into court who is too poor to hire a lawyer 
cannot be assured a fair trial unless counsel is 
provided for him." !d. at 344. The right to counsel 
includes the right to effective assistance of coun-
sel. Cuyler v. Sullivan, 446 U.S. 335 (1980); Hollo-
way v. Arkansas, 435 U.S. 475 (1978). Several courts 
have found ineffective assistance where defense 
counsel has failed to obtain the services of expert 
witnesses. "The failure of defense counsel to seek 
such assistance when the need is apparent de-
prives an accused of adequate representation in 
violation of his sixth amendment right to counsel." 
Proffitt v. U.S., 582 F.2d 854, 857 (4th Cir. 1978), 
cert. denied, 447 U.S. 910 (1980), Accord U.S. v. 
Fessel, 531 F.2d 1275, 1279 (5th Cir. 1976) ("when 
an insanity defense is appropriate and the defen-
dant lacks funds to secure private psychiatric 
assistance, it is the duty of his attorney to s.eek 
such assistance through the use of [the Criminal 
Justice Act]."). 
A number of courts have recognized that the 
right to effective assistance of counsel places an 
affirmative duty upon the state to provide expert 
assistance to indigent defendants. See Hintz v. 
Beta, 379 F.2d 937, 941 (5th Cir. 1967) ("effective 
assistance of counsel ... may necessitate a psy-
chiatric examination of a defendant."); Greer v. 
Beta, 379 F.2d 923, 925 (5th Cir. 1967) (state policy 
of not providing psychiatric experts for defense 
"cannot ... avoid the federal constitutional right to 
the effective assistance of counsel."); In re 
Ketchell, 68 Cal.2d 397, 399, 438 P.2d 625, 627, 66 
Cal. Rptr. 881, 883-84 (1968); People v. Worthy, 109 
Cal. App.3d 514, 167 Cal. Rptr. 402 (1980); State v. 
Rush, 46 N.J. 399, 217 A.2d 441 (1966); State v. Sec-
ond Judicial District Court, 85 Nev. 241, 453 P.2d 
421 (1969). As one court has noted, "[T]he right to 
counsel is meaningless if the lawyer is unable to 
make an effective defense because he has no 
funds to provide the specialized testimony the 
case requires." Bush v. McCollum, 231 F. Supp. 
560, 565 (N.D. Tex. 1964), aff'd, 344 F.2d 672 (5th 
Cir. 1965). 
The leading case is Williams v. Martin, 618 F.2d 
1021 (4th Cir. 1980), in which an indigent murder 
defendant requested the appointment of an inde-
pendent forensic pathologist to determine the vic-
tim's cause of death. The request was denied by 
the state trial court. In granting habeas relief, the 
Fourth Circuit based its decision, in part, on the 
right to counsel. "There can be no doubt that an 
effective defense sometimes requires the assist-
ance of an expert witness." /d. at 1025. Under this 
theory, expert assistance would be required if 
necessary for counsel to render reasonably effec-
tive assistance; that is, "whenever the expert ser-
vices are necessary to the preparation and presen-
tation of an adequate defense." Proffitt v. U.S., 582 
F.2d 854, 857 (4th Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 447 U.S. 
910 (1980). 
Equal Protection 
The equal protection argument for the appoint-
ment of defense experts had its genesis in Griffin 
v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12 (1956), in which an indigent 
defendant challenged a state practice of condition-
ing appellate review upon the availability of a 
transcript that the defendant could not afford. The 
Supreme Court held that failure to provide a free 
transcript denied the indigent defendant due proc-
ess and equal protection. "There can be no equal 
justice where the kind of trial a man gets depends 
on the amount of money he has." /d. at 19. 
Douglas v. California, 372 U.S. 353 (1963), extended 
the "Griffin principle" to the appointment of coun-
sel for a first appeal as of right. Other cases also 
echoed this principle. "Griffin v. Illinois and its 
progeny established the principle that the State 
must, as a matter of equal protection, provide indi-
gent prisoners with the basic tools of an adequate 
defense or appeal, when those tools are available 
for a price to other prisoners." Britt v. North Caro-
lina, 404 U.S. 226, 227 (1971). 
Several courts have relied on this line of cases 
in recognizing an indigent's right to expert assist-
ance. For example, one court has written: "It is ob-
vious that only [the defendant's] inability to pay for 
the services of a psychiatrist prevented a proper 
presentation of his case. The Supreme Court has 
unmistakably held that in criminal proceedings it 
will not tolerate discrimination between indigents 
and those who possess the means to protect their 
rights." Jacobs v. U.S., 350 F.2d 571, 573 (4th Cir. 
1965). The leading case is Williams v. Martin, 618 
F.2d 1021 (4th Cir. 1980), in which an indigent 
defendant requested the services of a forensic 
pathologist to evaluate the victim's cause of death 
in a homicide prosecution. The Fourth Circuit held 
that the trial court's refusal to appoint an expert 
"denied [the defendant] equal protection of the 
law." /d. at 1027. According to the court, the stand-
ard for determining whether expert assistance is 
constitutionally required is "(a) whether a substan-
tial question requiring expert testimony arose over 
the cause of death, and (b) whether Williams' 
defense could be fully developed without profes-
sional assistance." /d. at 1026. The court's exami-
nation of the record revealed that a substantial 
question about the cause of death did exist and 
that the absence of an expert witness hampered 
the development of this defense. In this regard, the 
court held that "[i]t is not incumbent upon Wil-
liams to prove ... that an independent expert would 
have provided helpful testimony at trial. An indi-
gent prisoner ... should not be required to present 
proof of what an expert would say when he is 
denied access to an expert." /d. at 1026-27. 
The principal problem with this line of cases is 
Ross v. Moffitt, 417 U.S. 600 (1974), which com-
mentators believe substantially undercuts the 
Griffin-Douglas rationale. See L. Tribe, American 
Constitutional Law 1119 (1978) (Douglas "effec-
tively sterilized" in Ross); Kamisar, Poverty, Equal-
ity, and Criminal Procedure: From Griffin v. Illinois 
and Douglas v. California to Ross v. Moffitt, in Na-
tional College of District Attorney, Constitutional 
Law Deskbook 1-78 (3d ed. 1978). Ross involved the 
appointment of counsel for discretionary appeals. 
The Supreme Court held that a state practice not 
to appoint counsel in such cases satisfied the 
equal protection guarantee. According to the 
Court, the equal protection clause "does not re-
quire absolute equality or precisely equal advan-
tages." 417 U.S. at 612. Although the Court recog-
nized the disadvantage an indigent suffered in 
comparison with a nonindigent in this context, it 
held that the "duty of the State ... is not to du p Ii-
cata the legal arsenal that may be privately re-
tained by a criminal defendant in a continuing ef-
fort to reverse his conviction, but only to assure 
the indigent defendant an adequate opportunity to 
present his claims fairly in the context of the 
State's appellate process." /d. at 616. Thus, the 
focus of the Court's analysis was not the disparity 
between indigent and nonindigent, but whether the 
indigent had an "adequate opportunity" to present 
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his case. This approach smacks more of a due 
process than an equal protection analysis. See 
Kamisar, supra, at 1-101. Earlier in the opinion the 
Court had pointed out that equal protection analy-
sis "emphasizes disparity in treatment by a State 
between classes of individuals whose situations 
are arguably indistinguishable," whereas due proc-
ess "emphasizes fairness between the State and 
the individual dealing with the State, regardless of 
how other individuals in the same situation may be 
treated." 417 U.S. at 609. 
Although Ross weakens the equal protection 
argument for expert assistance, it does not com-
pletely undercut it. Without an expert witness, an 
indigent may not have an "adequate opportunity" 
to present a defense. 
Due Process 
There are several lines of due process analysis 
that may support the right to defense experts. 
First, a defendant has a due process right to pre-
sent a defense. As the Supreme Court has noted, 
"Few rights are more fundamental than that of an 
accused to present witnesses in his own defense." 
Chambers v. Mississippi, 410 U.S. 284, 302 (1973). 
An indigent defendant may need the services of an 
expert to present a defense. The leading case is 
Little v. Streater, 452 U.S. 1 (1981), in which an indi-
gent defendant in a paternity action argued that 
the state's failure to provide funds for blood group-
ing tests deprived him of due process. The Su-
preme Court agreed. Referring to paternity actions 
as "quasi-criminal," the Court applied a three-step 
analysis. First, the Court identified the "private in-
terests at stake"-the financial burden on the 
defendant if he is adjudged to be the father and 
the creation of a parent-child relationship. The 
Court found these interests to be substantial. Sec-
ond, the Court considered the "risk that the pro-
cedures used will lead to erroneous results and 
the probable value of the suggested procedural 
safeguard." Here, the Court held that "access to 
blood grouping tests for indigent defendants ... 
would help to insure the correctness of paternity 
decisions .... " /d. at 14. Third, the Court consid-
ered the "governmental interests affected." Al-
though the Court recognized the state's financial 
interest if required to provide blood tests, it did not 
find that interest to be significant. In sum, the 
Court found that the state's failure to provide 
funds for blood grouping tests deprived the de-
fendant of his due process right to "a meaningful 
opportunity to be heard." /d. at 16. 
Applying these three elements to a case in 
which an indigent defendant in a criminal case re-
quests expert assistance is straightforward. First, 
a criminal defendant's interest in a criminal prose-
cution would be significantly greater than a civil 
defendant's stake in a paternity action. Second, 
the denial of the use of scientific evidence that 
has been recognized as reliable would create a 
substantial risk of erroneous results. Third, the 
state's interest, as in Streater, is financial. In manY 
cases the expense would be greater in a criminal 
case than in a paternity case, but it is doubtful 
that such an interest would outweigh the defend-
ant's interest in liberty. 
A second due process argument is based on the 
, state's providing expert assistance to the prosecu-
tion while denying such assistance to the defense. 
"'Due process' emphasizes fairness between the 
State and the individual dealing with the 
State .... " Ross v. Moffitt, 417 U.S. 600, 609 (1974). 
Thus, in discussing the right to expert assistance 
under the Criminal Justice Act, one court has 
noted: "If the fairness of our system is to be 
assured, indigent defendants must have access to 
minimal defense aids to offset the advantage pre-
sented by the vast prosecutoriai and investigative 
resources available to the Government." U.S. v. 
Hartfield, 513 F.2d 254, 258 (9th Cir. 1975). See also 
U.S. v. Stifei, 433 F.2d 431, 441 (6th Cir. 1970), cert. 
denied, 401 U.S. 994 (1971) ("[l]f the government 
sees fit to use this time consuming expensive 
means of fact-finding [neutron activation analysis], 
it must both allow time for a defendant to make 
similar tests, and in the instance of an indigent 
defendant, a means to provide for payment for 
same."). 
A third due process argument centers on the 
prosecutor's duty to disclose favorable material 
defense evidence under Brady v. Maryland, 373 
U.S. 83 (1963). A number of courts have regarded 
the failure of the state to provide expert assist-
ance as a denial of the right to present exculpa-
tory defense evidence. Thus, one court has written: 
"[T]he denial of a reasonable request to obtain the 
services of a necessary psychiatric witness is ef-
fectually a suppression of evidence violating the 
fundamental right of due process." U.S. ex rei. 
Robinson, 345 F.2d 691, 695 (7th Cir. 1965), att'd in 
part, remanded in part on other grounds, 383 U.S. 
375 (1966). Accord Bowen v. Eyman, 324 F. Supp. 
339, 340 (D. Ariz. 1970) ("refusal to run the tests is 
tantamount to a suppression of evidence such as 
--there was in Brady ... "). 
Compulsory Process 
in Washington v. Texas, 388 U.S. 14 (1967), the 
U.S. Supreme Court held that the compulsory proc-
ess clause applied in state trials. Moreover, the 
Court adopted a liberal view of the clause; it was 
not limited to the right to subpoena witnesses, but 
also included the right to present defense evi-
dence. "The right to offer the testimony of wit-
nesses, and to compel their attendance, if neces-
sary, is in plain terms the right to present a 
defense, the right to present the defendant's ver-
sion of the facts as well as the prosecution's to 
the jury so it may decide where the truth lies." !d. 
at 19. Although Washington did not involve expert 
~Witnesses, "it is scarcely conceivable that defend-
• ants could be constitutionally denied the opportu-
nity to calf experts to give opinion evidence about 
;such matters as fingerprints, bloodstains, sanity, 
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and other matters that routinely arise in criminal 
litigation." Western, Compulsory Process /1, 74 
Mich. L. Rev. '192, 203 (1975). 
A number of courts have based a defendant's 
right to expert testimony on the compulsory proc-
ess right. in Flores v. Estelle, 492 F.2d 711 (5th Cir. 
1974), for example, the defendant attempted to 
elicit expert opinion testimony from a state toxicol-
ogist who had been subpoenaed by the defense. 
The expert refused to give an opinion because he 
had not been retained as an expert witness and 
the trial court declined to require him to testify. 
The state and federal courts which reviewed the 
case agreed "that the trial court erred in refusing 
to require [the expert] to testify, thereby depriving 
Flores of effective compulsory process for obtain-
ing witnesses in his favor, Washington v. 
Texas .... " /d. at 712. 
The leading case is People v. Watson, 36 lli.2d 
228, 221 N.E.2d 645 (1966), in which an indigent 
forgery defendant requested the appointment of a 
handwriting expert. The Illinois Supreme Court 
held that the refusal to appoint the expert violated 
the defendant's right to compulsory process: 
The court recognizes that there is a distinction be-
tween the right to call witnesses and the right to have 
these witnesses paid for by the government, but in 
certain instances involving indigents, the lack of 
funds with which to pay for the witness will often 
preclude him from calling that witness and occa-
sionally prevent him from offering a defense. Thus, 
although the defendant is afforded the shadow of the 
right to call witnesses, he is deprived of the 
substance. /d. at 233. 
The court went on to conclude "[w]hether it is 
necessary to subpoena witnesses in order to 
assure a fair trial will depend upon the facts in 
each case." /d. at 234. Watson was such a case 
because the "issue of handwriting goes to the 
heart of the defense" and the expert's testimony 
"may have been crucial" to the defense. /d. 
COURT-APPOINTED EXPERTS 
A trial court has inherent authority to appoint ex-
pert witnesses. See Advisory Committee's Note, 
Fed. R. Evid. 706 ("The inherent power of a trial 
judge to appoint an expert of his own choosing is 
virtually unquestioned."); C. McCormick, Evidence 
§ 17 (2d ed. 1972); Sink, The Unused Power of a 
Federal Judge to Call His Own Expert Witnesses, 
29 S. Cal. L. Rev. 195 (1957). This authority has 
been codified in statutes and court rules in many 
jurisdictions. See 2 J. Wigmore, Evidence§ 563 
(Chadbourn rev. 1979) (listing rules and statutes). 
For a discussion of Ohio law on this subject, see 
P. Giannelli, Ohio Evidence Manual§ 702.07 (1982). 
Federal Evidence Rule 706(a) provides: 
The court may on its own motion or on the motion of 
any party enter an order to show cause why expert 
witnesses should not be appointed, and may request 
the parties to submit nominations. The court may ap-
point any expert witnesses agreed upon by the par-
ties, and may appoint expert witnesses of its own 
selection. An expert witness shall not be appointed by 
the court unless he consents to act. A witness so ap-
pointed shall be informed of his duties by the court in 
writing, a c.opy of which shall be filed with the clerk, 
or at a conference in which the parties shall have op-
portunity to participate. A witness so appointed shall 
advise the parties of his findings, if any; his deposi-
tion may be taken by any party; and he may be called 
to testify by the court or any party. He shall be sub-
ject to cross-examination by each party, including a 
party calling him as a witness. 
Rule 706(c) provides that the decision whether to 
disclose to the jury that the expert has been ap-
pointed lies within the discretion of the trial court. 
Rule 706(d) recognizes the right of the parties to 
call their own experts, notwithstanding the ap-
pointment of an expert by the court. See generally 
3D. Louisell & C. Mueller, Federal Evidence§ 
404-06 (1979); 3 J. Weinstein & M. Berger, Weins-
tein's Evidence 1 706[01] (1981). 
There are several disadvantages associated with 
the court appointment of expert witnesses. First, if 
the jury is informed of the appointment, the wit-
ness may be cloaked with the authority of the 
court, at least in the eyes of the jury. The Advisory 
Committee's Note to Rule 706 acknowledges this 
problem: "court appointed experts [may] acquire 
an aura of infallibility to which they are not en-
titled .... " Second, the motion for the appoint-
ment of an expert may disclose a defense theory 
previously unknown to the prosecution. In con-
trast, the motion for the appointment of a defense 
expert under the Criminal Justice Act is ex parte, 
thus precluding prosecution discovery in most 
cases. 
* * * 
RECENT DEVELOPMENTS 
The U.S. Supreme Court docket for the 1982-83 
term has begun to take shape. The Court has 
granted review in the following cases. 
Arrest, Search and Seizure 
Illinois v. Gates, 102 S. Ct. 997 (1982): (1) 
Whether detailed information provided by an anon-
ymous informer, coupled with government corrobo-
ration of information, provides probable cause for 
issuance of a search warrant; (2) Whether the 
Court should recognize a good faith exception to 
the exclusionary rule. 
Kolender v. Lawson, 102 S. Ct. 2033 (1982): 
Whether an individual may be punished for refus-
ing to identify himself during a lawful investigatory 
stop. 
6 
Texas v. Brown, 102 S. Ct. 2926 (1982): Whether 
warrantless seizure of a bulging tied-up balloon, 
which the police officer, based on his professional 
experience with illicit narcotics trade, allegedly 
had probable cause to believe contained illegal 
drugs, is valid under the Fourth Amendment. 
Florida v. Brady, 102 S. Ct. 2266 (1982): Whether 
the open fields doctrine is applicable to an 
1 ,800-acre open field that is fenced by barbed wire, 
locked, and posted. 
U.S. v. Place, 102 S. Ct. 2901 (1982): Whether 
police may seize and detain personal luggage rea-
sonably suspected of containing narcotics for the 
purpose of inspection by a narcotics detection 
dog. 
U.S. v. Knotts, 31 102 S. Ct. 2956 (1982): Whether 
beeper surveillance of the location or movement of 
an object that is within a private area requires a 
warrant. 
Jones v. U.S., 102 S. Ct. 999 (1982): Whether the 
defendant has the burden of proof for release after 
an insanity acquittal commitment. 
Florida v. Royer, 102 S. Ct. 631 (1982): Whether a 
stop at an airport based on the drug courier profile 
is valid under the Fourth Amendment. 
Right to Counsel 
Morris v. Slappy, 102 S. Ct. 1748 (1982): Whether 
the Sixth Amendment entitles a criminal defendant 
to demand continued representation by the same 
public defender who represented him earlier in the 
proceedings. 
Jones v. Barnes, 102 S. Ct. 2902 (1982): Whether 
assigned counsel is required to raise every nonfriv-
olous issue requested by a defendant on appeal 
from conviction. 
Prosecutorial Misconduct 
U.S. v. Hastings, 102 S. Ct. 2232 (1982): Whether 
the harmless error doctrine should be applied to a 
prosecutor's comment on defendant's failure to 
testify. 
Trial Proceedings 
Pillsbury Co. v. Conboy, 102 S. Ct. 998 (1982): 
Whether civil deposition testimony which repeats 
prior testimony given under a use immunity statute 
is information directly or indirectly derived from 
such testimony and whether such testimony is 
unavailable for use against the deponent in any 
subsequent prosecution. 
South Dakota v. Neville, 102 S. Ct. 2232 (1982): 
Whether the evidentiary use of a drunk driver's 
refusal to take a blood-alcohol test violates the 
Fifth Amendment. 
